We construct new multiparty signature schemes that allow multiple signers to sequentially produce a compact, fixedlength signature simultaneously attesting to the message(s) they want to sign. First, we introduce a new primitive that we call ordered multisignatures (OMS), which allow signers to attest to a common message as well as the order in which they signed. Our OMS construction substantially improves computational efficiency over any existing scheme with comparable functionality. Second, we design a new identitybased sequential aggregate signature scheme, where signers can attest to different messages and signature verification does not require knowledge of traditional public keys. The latter property permits savings on bandwidth and storage as compared to public-key solutions. In contrast to the only prior scheme to provide this functionality, ours offers improved security that does not rely on synchronized clocks or a trusted first signer. Security proofs according to the corresponding security definitions and under appropriate computational assumptions are provided for all the proposed schemes. We give several applications of our schemes to secure network routing, and we believe that they will find many other applications as well.
INTRODUCTION
Motivation. The current Internet design largely lacks the principles of AAA: Authentication, Authorization, and Accountability. It is understood that incorporation of these principles would make tackling security and reliability problems more tractable.
A large body of recent research focuses on identifying weak points in the current design and proposing fixes to the deployed infrastructure. For example, the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) initiative (and its variants) [26, 1, 28, 45, 43, 14, 18, 15] , whose primary goal is to patch authenticity of route announcements in BGP, a pathvector protocol used in Internet routing, is currently under consideration for standardization by the IETF. While it is accepted that new security measures are necessary, many remain skeptical about the prospects of widespread adoption and deployment in the near future. The main technical reason is that secure networking adds time, space, and communication complexity overhead to protocols. We view our role as cryptographers in this regard as designing suitable provably-secure mechanisms to address the identified weaknesses, which maintain as closely as possible the design goals of the original protocols, especially in terms of processing time, storage and bandwidth requirements, and scalability.
In line with this view, we introduce two new schemes for efficiently enhancing authenticity in several network routing applications. Our schemes offer important performance and security improvements as compared to previous solutions. We show that they provably provide security according to the corresponding security definitions (that are of independent interest) and under appropriate computational assumptions. We now discuss our schemes and their applications in more detail.
Ordered Multisignatures. We introduce a new primitive that we call ordered multisignatures (OMS). A multisignature scheme [7, 31] is a public-key primitive that allows multiple signers who want to sign some message to produce a single compact (constant-size) signature such that a verifier is convinced that each signer signed the message. However, some network routing applications that we discuss below require verifying the path in which a packet travels to reach its destination. Multisignatures are not sufficient for such applications because authenticity depends not only on which routers signed (a fixed part of) the packet, but also the order in which they did. Ensuring the signing order in multisignatures has been previously addressed, however, the constructions require interactions among the signers and are not suitable for applications we consider. We discuss these works in more detail later. Aggregate signatures [12] of course immediately provide the needed functionality if, say, the signers sign, in addition to the packet, their position on the path, but they are also much less efficient.
As an alternative, the OMS primitive we consider produces a constant-size multisignature, is sequential in that the signers sign one after another but does not require further interaction among the signers, and ensures authenticity of both the signing order and that of the message. We propose a formal security model for OMS and provide a construction that we prove secure, under standard computational assumptions, in the random oracle (RO) model of [5] . As compared to known aggregate schemes, our construction offers substantial computational savings. Section 3 gives detailed efficiency comparisons.
We sketch applications of our OMS scheme in more detail. One problem that may be suitable for OMS is raised in [22] and deals with allowing ASes to verify that data packets they send and receive actually travel via authenticated BGP (by which we mean eBGP, i.e. external to ASes) routes. To do this, a (fixed part of) packet should be signed, in order, by egress routers that forward it, so that ASes will accept packets only that followed an authenticated path (and similarly by ingress routers that receive it, so that ASes can verify that packets they forward actually take the intended path, signatures attesting to which could be piggybacked onto traffic on the reverse path).
Another setting where OMS may help arises in the recent in-band network troubleshooting system Orchid [36] . Orchid has routers along a flow mark fixed-size headers in the data packets. The first packet triggers a probe, which is sent to find out which routers are on the path. Later, a certain pattern of marks in the data packets by a router can implicate packet re-ordering or duplication by the previous router on the path, according to the data collected by the probe. When deployed across multiple networks (i.e. ASes), a router may wish to "frame" a router in another network by making it appear that the latter is directly upstream from it. Thus some fixed field in the probe should be signed, in order, by all the routers on the path before data collected about the flow can be considered authentic.
We suggest that the computational savings our scheme provides over existing solutions is desirable in the abovementioned applications because it (1) distributes processing time more equitably amongst routers, (2) offers a sizable gain in total processing time, and (3) scales better in the number of routers or autonomous systems (ASes, i.e. each network under control of a single entity).
ID-based Sequential Aggregate Signatures. It has been pointed out in numerous works and tested in [45] that aggregate signatures [12, 32] , which allow multiple signers to sign different messages while keeping total signature size constant, can be used to address route announcement authenticity in S-BGP while significantly reducing associated bandwidth overhead. Each AS forwarding an update message should sign the currently-announced IP prefix along with the address of the next AS on the route (the latter to prevent an unauthorized AS from picking up the path, which is what makes OMS insufficient here), so that route authenticity can be verified upon receipt of the aggregate.
However, any public-key-infrastracture-(PKI-)based cryptographic proposal for networking applications requires parties to know the authentic public keys of all other parties involved. This means that, in practice, these protocols suffer the overhead of distributing the public key and certificate of each user to all other users, and then each router storing these keys and certificates indefinitely, or otherwise they have to be sent along with each path announcement. IDbased cryptography, in which an arbitrary identity (e.g. an IP address) acts as a users' public key and signature verification requires knowledge only of a sender's identity in addition to a "master" public key of the PKG, can offer a superior alternative for such applications [44, 24, 3] (subject to various tradeoffs). This is because most of the information needed for verification will already be contained in its description. However, the only provably-secure ID-based aggregate signature scheme to date is that of [24] , which has the restriction that the first signer in a path needs to be trusted to pick a fresh random nonce each time, or else the scheme is subject to attacks. Alternatively, one could rely on synchronized clocks of the signers in order to instantiate this nonce via a time-stamp, but an honest computer's perceived clock-time might be altered by a simple virus, leading to new attacks in practice.
We provide the first construction of a (sequential) identitybased aggregate scheme that does not place any such restriction on the signers. ("Sequential" here refers to the fact that, as for OMS, signatures are aggregated one-by-one as the aggregate-so-far moves along the path, as is natural in the routing-based applications we consider.) We prove our construction secure in the RO model under a suitable modification of an assumption previously used e.g. in [33, 17, 2] . To help justify hardness of this new assumption, we prove it in the generic bilinear group model of [10] .
Our scheme fits in nicely with S-BGP, especially because storage overhead has been cited as a major concern [15] . Identities would roughly consist of an organization name, AS number, and IP address range; the latter is included in an AS-path anyway and all together are vastly smaller than traditional public keys and certificates. Each identity would be bound to a secret key by a PKG, e.g. ICANN or IANA. In practice, a PKG can be in a hierarchy rooted at the latter [29] , whereby it can issue user secret keys that can be verified via the master public keys of the PKGs on the path to the root. Note that the overhead associated with obtaining and storing these keys, which is equivalent to that of obtaining and storing public-keys of a hierarchical certification authority (CA), is typically much smaller than that from using traditional public keys and certificates for the signers, which the ID-based setting cuts out.
Moreover, we point out that the security model we define and under which we prove our IBSAS scheme secure is considerably stronger than that of [24] , owing to an issue of whether an adversary should be able to "extract" individual signatures from an aggregate (see also [12] ) or combine them with other aggregates. (We further explain this issue in Section 4.) This is completely orthogonal to the fact that our scheme does not rely on a trusted first signer or synchronized clocks for security. Though we do not have any specific applications for this enhancement, it makes our construction potentially useful in other emerging security applications such as outsourced databases (cf. [38] ).
Other Related Work. Verifiability of signing order in multisignatures has been considered before, specifically in [20, 21, 13, 35, 42] , where they are usually called "structured" or "order-specified." There are several key differences between their work and ours. Firstly, they mainly treat more complicated structures on the group of signers than just linear ordering. Secondly, they do not give specific applications of their schemes. Finally, the schemes they consider are interactive, in the sense they require multiple rounds of communication between co-signers (sometimes both in key generation and signing), which is impractical in applications we consider. It is fair to say that our OMS primitive is new and more practical as compared to this prior work.
"One-way signature chains," studied in [39] , are too strong for the applications we consider in that a signer attests to which specific signers came before it (see Section 3, remark), and their construction does not provide an efficiency gain over existing aggregate signature schemes. Herranz and Galindo et al. [27, 23] obtain results about ID-based schemes permitting aggregation of messages from the same signer only. Interactive (i.e. multi-round) multisignatures are also studied in [3, 4] . "Append-only" signatures [30] is an interesting public-key primitive suggested for use in S-BGP route attestation, but no construction beating ω( √ n)-size signatures for n signers is currently known. . We extend set-theoretic notation to lists where appropriate. All algorithms considered in this paper are possibly randomized unless indicated otherwise. By convention, the running-time of an algorithm includes that of any overlying experiment.
PRELIMINARIES
Bilinear Maps. Our schemes make use of bilinear maps (aka. pairings). Let G, GT be groups of prime order p. Following a convention in the cryptographic community we write both groups multiplicatively. We call a pairing an efficiently computable map e : G × G → GT such that the following two conditions hold:
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z we have that e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab .
• Non-degeneracy: For any generator g ∈ G we have e(g, g) = 1 G T (the identity in GT ).
Observe that e(·, ·) is symmetric since e(g a , g
In practice, the bit-length of representation of elements in G is about 300 bits, and the cost of computing a pairing can be that of roughly four exponentiations. While pairing computation is expensive, on-going research (see e.g. [41] ) and hardware implementations may bring this cost down. Note that we purposely do not consider the "asymmetric" setting as in e : G1 × G2 → GT because, although in this case elements in G1 could be represented with less bits, for those in G2 it would be much greater, and, since our signatures would contain elements of both, this would negate any benefit. (See [16] for a good discussion of this phenomenon.)
Computational Diffie-Hellman. We first recall the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) in the group G (of prime order p). We say that an algorithm A has advantage in solving the CDH in G if
is at least . The CDH is said to be (t, )-hard in G (omitting explicit reference to the group when clear) if all algorithms running in time at most t have advantage no greater than in solving the CDH.
Modified-LRSW. Security of our ID-based scheme relies a stronger assumption that we call the Modified-LRSW (M-LRSW). First we recall the LRSW assumption, which was originally proposed by Lysyanskaya, Sahai, Rivest, and Wolf for pseudonym systems in [33] and has subsequently been used to construct anonymous credential systems [17] and compact e-cash [2] . For
(·) denote the oracle that on input m ∈ Zp chooses u $ ← G (with G as above) and outputs the triple (u x+mxy , u y , u). We say that an algorithm A has advantage in breaking the LRSW in G if
is at least , for some m ∈ Zp not queried to the oracle and any v = 1 G . The M-LRSW is defined in a similar way to the above.
We say that an algorithm A has advantage in breaking the M-LRSW in G if
is at least , for any m ∈ Zp not queried to the oracle (note that 0 could not have been queried by definition) and any x ∈ Zp. We say that the M-LRSW is (t, q, )-hard in G if all algorithms running in time at most t and making at most q oracle queries have advantage no greater than in breaking the M-LRSW. The main difference between the M-LRSW and LRSW is that in the former the randomness chosen by the oracle goes into the exponent of fixed bases, while in the latter a random base element is chosen by the oracle. As evidence that this variant is also hard, we prove it in the generic bilinear group model of [10] (see Section 5).
ORDERED MULTISIGNATURES

OMS Schemes and Their Security
Syntax. Ordered multisignatures (OMS) are a natural extension of the notion of multisignatures [34] , in which a constant-size multisignature on a message attests not only to the fact that some specified group of signers signed it also the order in which they signed. Note that OMS schemes are "sequential" by nature. As discussed in the introduction, applications include data plane security in BGP [22] and secure diagnosis of network faults [37, 36] . Formally, we specify an OMS scheme OMS = (OPg, OKg, OSign, OVf) by four algorithms:
• A parameter generation algorithm OPg that outputs some global information I for the scheme.
• A key generation algorithm OKg that on input global information I outputs a public-private key pair (pk, sk).
• A signing algorithm OSign that takes as input a secret key sk, a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , an OMS-so-far σ, and
• A verification algorithm OVf that takes a list of public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n , a message m, an OMS σ, and and returns a bit 1 or 0.
For consistency, we require that OVf(Ln, m, σn) = 1 for all n ∈ N and all m ∈ {0, 1} * , where the probability is over the experiment:
Security. We adapt the notion of security for multisignatures first presented in [7] to our context. Intuitively, a "secure" OMS scheme, in addition to being secure as a plain multisignature scheme, must enforce an additional unforgeability with respect to ordering on the signers; it should not be possible for the other signers on a multisignature to change the apparent position at which an honest signer signed the message, even if all the other signers involved are malicious. (Note that this also implies that two multisignatures cannot be "glued" together; e.g. a forger who sees two multisignatures on some message from signers A, B and from C, D cannot produce a multisignature on the same message from A, B, C, D. Security of plain multisignatures does not prevent this.) Our model does not explicitly capture the natural requirement that an honest user should only sign as position i on a path if it is in fact at position i. The way we ensure this is instead simply by requiring the signing algorithm in the definition of OMS to verify validity of the signature-so-far (and 1 In all applications we consider, repeated signers in the signature path are unnecessary and sometimes even constitute a security vulnerability (e.g. repeated ASes in a BGP route).
return ⊥ if it is invalid) in order to confirm the actual signing order. (Otherwise, an adversary that modifies messages in transit could simply tell the third signer to sign as the tenth, and the tenth to sign as the third, for example.) Also note that, similarly to the model of [7] , we require users to prove knowledge of their secret keys during public-key registration with a CA. For simplicity, this is modeled by requiring an adversary to hand over secret keys of malicious signers. This is known as the registered or certified key model. Attack: F runs on input I, pk. F may query a key registration oracle with a key-pair (pk , sk ) and coins C, which registers pk as valid if OKg when run on input I and coins C outputs (pk , sk ). (This is a simplified model of a possibly more-complex key registration protocols with a CA that involves proofs of knowledge of secret keys.) F also has access to signing oracle OSign(·, sk, ·, ·), which it may query accordingly, the last input being a list of distinct registered public keys (including the empty list, in which case the oracle just returns a signature under sk). 
We say that F (t, qs, nmax, )-breaks the scheme if it outputs a forgery in the above experiment with probability at least , taken over the coin flips of the setup algorithm, the oracles, and any by F itself, and runs in at most time t, making at most qs calls to its signing oracle, and its lists of signers used in its calls to the latter and in its final output (i.e., L * above) have length at most nmax. We say that OMS is (t, qs, nmax, )-secure if no forger (t, qs, nmax, )-breaks it.
Remark. We further note that our security model guarantees authenticity of the message signed and position of an honest signer, but not to which specific signers signed before her. For example, the model allows that after an honest signer with public key pk * puts its signature on message m * into an OMS for (pk 1 , m * ), the resulting OMS could be later modified to verify for some list ((pk 2 , m * ), (pk * , m * )). This turns out to be acceptable in the applications we consider. Namely, in network troubleshooting [37, 36] , reports of packet loss or reordering by a particular router typically indicates a problem upstream, so a main security property we want is that an honest router should not be believed to be further upstream than it actually is -but it does not matter to the router who is upstream. In authenticity proposals for BGP, having routers attest to the previous signers is also never done, since ASes are assumed to be possibly malicious but non-colluding (cf. [30, Pg. 17 , footnote]). The latter is because otherwise route-authenticity cannot be achieved anyway, as a valid-looking intermediate path in which an update did not actually travel could always be appended to the advertised path between two malicious ASes, if all they and all the purported intermediate nodes are colluding.
Our OMS Construction and Analysis
The scheme. Our construction extends Boldyreva's multisignature scheme [7] to suitably encode signer orders as well as the message they sign. The scheme has a fixed signature length regardless of the number of co-signers, namely of about 600 bits in practice, and is substantially more efficient than all existing alternatives in this context; see below.
Construction 3.2. We fix groups G, GT of prime order p with a pairing e : G × G → GT . To these we associate the following construction:
Global Parameters: The algorithm picks a random generator g ∈ G and cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → G. (The analysis will model the latter as a random oracle [5] , adjusting security definitions accordingly.) It outputs (G, GT , e, g, H) as the global information I for the scheme. 
Verification: On input (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), m, σ, the algorithm parses σ as (S, R) and returns 1 iff:
Consistency follows straightforwardly from the properties of the pairing.
Thus an ordered multisignature on m by n signers with public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ) has the form:
where all indices above range from 1 to n and ri is the randomness chosen by the ith signer.
Efficiency Evaluation and Comparisons.
Step 1 in the signing algorithm requires one exponentiation. Steps 2, 3, and 4 can essentially be executed in the time of one 3-term multi-exponentiation (which is faster than computing 1.5 individual exponentiations). This relies on the fact that that the values of j (like those of i in the verification algorithm) are very small; exponentiations typically use a random r ∈ Zp instead, which has bit-length about 300 bits, but, even with a thousand co-signers, i, j have bit-length of about 10, which is an efficiency difference of factor at least 30. So the scheme requires about the time for 2.5 300-bit exponentiations on signing (plus the time for verification) and three pairing computations on verification. The previous best alternative in this context seems to be the "random-oracle version" of the recent aggregate scheme of Lu et al. [31, Section 3.4] , which, for basically the same level of concrete security and signature size, 2 requires about n additional exponentiations on signing/verification (though one less pairing, the gain from which is lost for about n > 2), where n is the number of co-signers. Even though multiexponentiation can be used to speed these up, this is not without significant drawback. Specifically, recall that for a factor w decrease in exponentiation time there would be roughly a factor n2 w (300/w)-bit increase in memory usage for pre-computation on each signing. This is tight for routers; large pre-computation tables cannot be stored in fast memory, and routing protocols already strain memory usage even without security measures. Our scheme reduces the work (in terms of the number of exponentiations) per signer to constant in the number of previous co-signers without increasing memory usage.
On the other hand, signature length is just 160 bits and signing is, strictly speaking, more efficient in the scheme of [12] than for ours, but verification is vastly slower, requiring a linear amount of pairing computations in the number of co-signers, and verification is needed anyway upon signing for OMS. This means that, for their scheme, processing time scales very poorly, e.g. in the number of ASes in BGP, which is of concern [15] . In most applications, however, a fixed 600 bit overhead in packet size for signatures is still manageable. Finally, we observe that the scheme of [32] either requires proofs of knowledge for RSA keys on keyregistration or public exponents bigger than the 1024-bit modulus, the latter being used for verification. As for RSA the former are much more expensive than those for discrete log and not used in practice, this means that in addition to having greater bandwidth than ours, their scheme will also require the equivalent of at least 3n 300-bit exponentiations on signing/verification, where n is the number of co-signers.
Security. The following implies that the above scheme is secure (in the RO model) if the CDH is hard in G.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose CDH is (t, )-hard in G. Then Construction 3.2 scheme is (t , qs, nmax, )-secure in the RO model for any qs, nmax ≥ 0, t ≤ t + O(τ nmax(qs + 1)), and ≤ 2nmaxe(qs + 1) , where τ is the time for an exponentiation in G.
Proof. Given a forger F against the scheme, we construct a simulator B that input G, GT , e, g, g a , g b runs F in order to solve the CDH. B will flip a fair coin γ to determine which of its simulations to run. For γ = 1, B's simulation will allow it (with high probability) to solve the CDH in the case that F produces a valid multisignature that includes the honest signer on a new message that has not been queried to the signing oracle at all. For γ = 0, B's simulation will allow it (with high probability) to solve the CDH in the case that F re-orders an honest signer's position in a multisignature on a message it has already queried for.
More specifically, if γ = 1, B runs F on input (G, GT , e, g, H), (g a , g t , g u ) for randomly chosen t, u ∈ Zp. Then:
• Key registration queries are answered according to the functionality specified in Definition 3.1.
• Using Coron's technique [19] , on a hash query mi, B sets a bit δi to 1 with probability δ, for some value of δ that we will specify later, and 0 otherwise. B chooses a random xi ∈ Zp and if δi = 1 returns g x i , and otherwise it returns (g b )
• On a signing query mj, σ, L, let |L| = k − 1. B checks that OVf(mj, σ, L) = 1 and all keys in L are registered, else returns ⊥. It aborts if δj = 0. Otherwise it first computes the honest signer's component in the OMS, namely (g a ) x j g t+ku , and then aggregates-in signature components for the malicious signers (using the same order values as in the query), which it can do because it knows their secret keys from registration, and returns the result. As in the proof of [31, Theorem 3.1], this "reconstruction" technique works because the OMS-sofar is verified and re-randomized upon signing.
• If B does not abort, then F 's view is identical that in the real experiment. Since the δ-values chosen by B are hidden from F and thus independent of its queries, by a simple counting argument the probability that B does not abort for a given value of 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is at least δ qs (1 − δ). The latter is maximized by setting δOPT = qs/(qs + 1), for which the probability that B does not abort is at least 1/(e(qs +1)). So if F forges and has not queried m * in the forgery to its hash oracle, B solves the CDH with probability 1/e(qs + 1).
• Key registration and hash queries are answered as in the previous case.
• On a signing query mj, σ, L, let 
r , and the honest signer's component is (S, g r ). If δ = 0 and k = i, then, using a trick of Boneh and Boyen [9] , B sets S to
is the honest signer's component, which again has the correct distribution and can be computed by the simulator. As before, B then aggregates-in the signatures components of the malicious signers (using the same order values for each component as in the query), as it knows their secret keys, and returns the result.
• On a forgery L The analysis for this case is similar. F 's view is identical to that in the real experiment if B does not abort, and for appropriate value of δ the probability that B does not abort is at least 1/nmaxe(qs + 1). So if F forges and has queries m * in its forgery to its hash oracle, then B solves CDH with probability 1/(enmax(qs + 1)). Now observe that both possible simulations above are identically distributed from F 's perspective, and, as it gets no information about γ, the latter has the correct value for the type of forgery output by F with probability 1/2. Thus if F forges with probability , B solves CDH with probability at least 1/2nmaxe(qs +1); the relation between and stated in the theorem then follows. (A more formal argument is given in the full version [8] .)
The relation between t and t follows from running-time analysis of B, which takes into account our convention to include in the running-time of F that of its overlying experiment. Note that in either case B's extra work is proportional to an additional number of exponentiations linear in the number of co-signers, of which there are at most nmax, on each signing query and on the forgery.
ID-BASED SEQUENTIAL AGGREGATE SIGNATURES
As noted in previous works [24, 3, 4] , sending the public key and certificate of each signer when using a constant-size multiparty signature scheme can defeat the purpose of developing such primitives to minimize bandwidth overhead in the first place; alternatively, if all public keys and certificates are to be obtained and stored by each user, this dramatically increases set-up and storage overhead of the protocol. In the ID-based setting, where an arbitrary string can be used in place of a public key, most of the information needed to verify an aggregate signature will be included in the transmission anyway, or can be for almost no appreciable loss in bandwidth. Though we are not the first to recognize this point, our construction improves upon the security of previous solutions and removes any undue restrictions on the signers, making our scheme more useful in practice.
IBSAS Schemes and Their Security
Syntax. Similar to [24] , we specify an identity-based sequential aggregate signature (IBSAS) scheme AS = (Setup, KeyDer, Sign, Vf) by four algorithms:
• A setup algorithm Setup initially run by the trusted private-key generator (PKG) to generate its master public key mpk and corresponding master secret key msk. The master public key mpk is global to the system.
• A private-key derivation algorithm KeyDer run by the PKG on input msk, ID for any user's identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , to generate the private key skID for user ID.
• A signing algorithm Sign run by a user ID * that takes as input its secret key skID * and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , a list ( (ID1, m1) , . . . , (IDi, mi) ) of signers and messages, an aggregate-so-far σ, and the master public key pk. It returns a new aggregate signature σ , or ⊥ to indicate that the input was invalid.
• A verification algorithm Vf that takes as input a list of signer-message pairs ( (ID1, m1) , . . . , (IDn, mn) ) and an IBSAS σ outputs a bit 1 or 0 (indicating that σ is valid or invalid on this list, respectively).
For consistency, we require that Vf(Ln, σn) = 1 for all n ∈ N and all {(IDi, mi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, IDi ∈ {0, 1} * , mi ∈ {0, 1} * }, where the probability is over the experiment:
Security. Our notion of security for IBSAS captures the intuition that an adversary (forger) who can adaptively query for signatures on lists of user-message pairs of its choice and "corrupt" users by requesting their private keys, should not be able to subsequently generate a valid signature (forgery) on a list of co-signers and their messages that it did not query to its signing oracle and could not have produced trivially by "dividing out" a signature of a corrupted user to the reply on one of its queries. This is stronger than what is "typically" expected of aggregate signatures, as elaborated below. We also stress that, as discussed in [3] , it is important here that the adversary is able to adaptively corrupt users, unlike the public-key setting, where wlog it just receives a public key for one honest user.
Definition 4.1. Let AS = (Setup, KeyDer, Sign, Vf) be an IBSAS scheme. We consider an experiment with a forger F with access to two oracles, that runs in three stages:
Setup: The experiment generates a master key-pair via (mpk,
msk)
$ ← Setup and gives mpk to F .
Attack: F then runs on input mpk with access to two oracles KeyDer(msk, ·) and O Sign (·, ·, ·). The first operates according to the above definition of a signing algorithm for IBSAS. The second on input a list of "current" signer-message pairs ( (ID1, m1) , . . . , (IDi−1, mi−1) ), a list of signer-message pairs "to-add" ( (IDi, mi) , . . . , (ID k , m k ) ), and an aggregate-so-far σ executes: We say that F (t, qk, qs, nmax, ) -breaks the scheme if it outputs a forgery in the above experiment with probability at least , taken over the coin flips of the setup algorithm, the oracles, and any by F itself, and runs in at most time t, making at most q k calls to its key-derivation oracle and at most qs to its signing oracle, and all aggregate signatures involved in the experiment have length at most nmax. We say that AS is (t, qk, qs, nmax, )-secure if no forger (t, q k , qs, nmax, )-breaks it.
Comparison to Previous Definitions. First, we note that our security definition for IBSAS, like that for the public-key case in [31] (but unlike in [32] ), does not require that an individual signature in an aggregate attest to which signatures came before it (or even the position of the signer like in an OMS). Indeed, this issue is immaterial in practice for aggregate signatures anyway, since there is a simple trick to change a scheme meeting the weaker definition into one meeting the stronger, namely have each co-signer in sequence sign, in addition to its message, the identities and messages of the signers before it.
Moreover, in typical definitions of security for aggregate signatures, e.g. for that in [24] , the adversary only "wins" if it produces an aggregate signature on a list L that contains some (IDi, mi) never queried before -i.e., for all the adversary's queries L , (IDi, mi) is not in L . In some applications, one may want that, after seeing an aggregate signature for ((ID1, m1), (ID2, m2)) with uncorrupted identities ID1, ID2, the adversary cannot "extract" a signature of ID1 on m1, or more generally that sub-signatures in different aggregates cannot be "mixed-and-matched" to create new aggregates by an adversary that does not know the private keys for the signers of these sub-signatures. This has come up previously in applications like verifiably encrypted signatures [12] and outsourced databases [38] . Given that the signing oracle in our security model allows the adversary to specify multiple potentially-uncorrupted identities for which to add signatures, and we can assume as per the above remark that each co-signer in sequence also signs the identities and messages of the signers before it, our forgery condition does ensure this property.
Our IBSAS Construction and Analysis
The Scheme. We present our construction of a sequential IBAS scheme. As we mentioned, a sequential scheme is wellsuited for several applications, in particular secure routing protocols. Our scheme is efficient and yields constant signatures of only three group elements. In particular, verification requires a small constant amount of pairing computations, though a linear (in the number of previous co-signers) number of exponentiations. Construction 4.2. We fix groups G, GT of prime order p with a pairing e : G × G → GT . To these we associate the following construction:
Setup: The algorithm picks a random generators u, v, g ∈ G, random α ∈ Zp, and cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
* → G and H2 : {0, 1} * → Zp.
(The analysis will model these functions as random oracles [5] , adjusting security definitions accordingly.) It outputs (G, GT , e, u, v, g, g α , H1, H2) as the mpk and α as the msk.
Key Derivation: On input msk and ID ∈ {0, 1} * , as the secret key skID for user ID the algorithm outputs H1(ID) α . 
If not, the algorithm halts with output 0. If verification holds, it continues to the next step, where it computes Z ← Z i H 2 (s i ) and then checks if:
If not, the algorithm halts with output 0. If so, it outputs 1 to accept the signature. Consistency follows straightforwardly.
To see what the scheme is "doing," it is helpful to write out the form of an aggregate signature in our scheme on a message m1, . . . mn by n signers ID1, . . . , IDn, respectively. As before, let si denote the string ID1 m1 . . . IDi mi. Below, all indices in products range from 1 to n unless otherwise specified, and the notation a1 · · · ai · · · an means that ith term is missing in the product.
where ri ∈ Zp is the randomness chosen by signer IDi.
Note that in the construction we do not perform a verification call on signing. Although in S-BGP eventually all incoming route attestations need to be verified anyway, what this means is that in this application the verification call could be delayed (i.e. performed after the aggregate-so-far has been added-to and forwarded) without losing the proof of security. This is important because it is desirable to perform such "lazy" verification of these updates [45] .
Security. The following establishes that our IBSAS scheme is secure (in the RO model) if the M-LRSW is hard in G. M-LRSW is (t, q, ) Proof. The proof is in [8] .
On the Design. As observed in [24] , the main difficulty in constructing an identity-based aggregate scheme is that one needs a common "place" to aggregate all the randomness chosen by the signers. In fact, the group element used in their scheme for this purpose must be generated based on a nonce specific to each aggregate and common to all cosigners, meaning all signers involved need to be certain that they have never used the nonce before. Otherwise, there are linear-algebraic attacks to recover secret keys, since messages are put into exponents on the secret keys (cf. [24, Remark 3] ). Indeed, they remark that this step seems necessary to enable aggregation. Unfortunately, it also makes their scheme vulnerable to certain attacks in practice, since one would typically use a time-stamp as the nonce, but then the possibility of malicious altering an honest computer's perceived clock-time, say by installing a simple virus that can get no information about the secret key, introduces new attacks on the scheme in practice.
Our design, however, shows that such a common place to aggregate the randomness in not necessary. To get around the problem, we devise a way to embed message-signer pair, via multiplication, into the random exponent chosen by the signer, which eliminates the above-mentioned attacks. To do this securely, we create a kind of "dual" signature in which the randomness chosen by a signer is also tied to a middle component containing a factor the secret key, such that an adversary should not be able to change this randomness in any harmful way.
Hierarchical PKGs. As it is important for the S-BGP application, we sketch an extension of our scheme to the case that users' private keys are generated via PKG's in a hierarchy, based on [25] . For this, the root PKG will also choose another public cryptographic hash function H3. (As shown in [5] , in the RO model it is easy to obtain as many independent hash functions as one would like.) The scheme will always use the same "public parameters" G, GT , e, u, v, g, H1, H2, H3, but each PKG Pi will choose its own random αi ∈ Zp as its master secret key and release g α i as its master public key. For a PKG below the root, Pi's parent will also provide it with the value of Si = i j=1 H3(Pj ) α j−1 , where (P1, . . . , Pi) is the path from the root to Pi and α0 = α, which Pi keeps secret. As the private key for a user ID, Pn will return Sn · H1(ID)
αn . Signing and verification are modified in the straightforward way; users with different PKGs can still aggregate their signatures.
As long as the hierarchy is not too large, a value ei = e(H3(Pi), g α i−1 ) for a PKG Pi can be cached, and thus verification does not take much longer than in the basic scheme. (Recall that if ei is cached, then to compute e(H3(Pi) β , g α i−1 ) for some β ∈ Zp one can simply compute e β i .) Security wrt forging a secret key for a new PKG essentially follows from the original proof of Gentry and Silverberg [25] , with a slight loss in concrete security due to hashing the Pi's separately to enable aggregation (cf. [24, Section 4] ). Our own security proof wrt forging a new aggregate still goes through virtually unchanged, as the simulator would play the role of all the PKGs and would not need to "program" any values of H3.
ON THE HARDNESS OF M-LRSW
While it would be preferable to prove the security of our ID-based scheme under a more established computational assumption, given the new functionality that the scheme provides this is not always possible (cf. e.g. [6] ). We aim here to more carefully justify the assumption. Generic groups [40] model an inability of algorithms to use group representation (i.e. special properties of a group beyond the mere fact that it is a group, or in our case, a bilinear group) to its advantage in solving a computational problem. We establish a strong upper bound on an algorithm's advantage in breaking the M-LRSW assumption in this setting in terms of its running time. This has become a standard way of justifying new cryptographic assumptions, especially in bilinear groups (e.g. [10, 11] ). Note that, as there do not actually exist any generic groups that are computationally efficient, our result does not imply that the M-LRSW problem is hard in practice. But it is reassuring in that the best-known algorithms for similar assumptions in the elliptic-curve groups over which our schemes can be realized are in fact generic, and our proof applies to such algorithms.
The Model. We follow a similar model and proof technique of [10] . Let G, GT be groups of prime order p with generators g, gT respectively and a pairing e : G × G → GT . From the perspective of a generic algorithm, the elements in these groups will be encoded as random strings of length log p via injective maps ξ, ξT : Zp → {0, 1} log p internal to the experiment, where ξ(a) is the random-string encoding of g a and similarly for ξT . The algorithm is given input the random-string encodings of some elements, and at any time-step can query group operation oracles for G, GT with two encodings α1, α2 ∈ {0, 1} log p and a bit b to return, ξ(ξ −1 (α1) · ξ −1 (α2) −b ), where "·" is the operation in the appropriate group, and can query a bilinear map oracle with encodings α3, α4 ∈ {0, 1} log p , which returns ξT (e(ξ −1 (α3), ξ −1 (α4))). We assume wlog that the algorithm only queries "legitimate" encodings for elements of the appropriate group, meaning received either as part of its input or as a response to a previous query. Proof. The proof is in [8] .
In practice, qs corresponds roughly to a number of signatures that an adversary may see, so should be set to about, say, 2 30 . Plugging this in, our theorem allows practitioners to gauge how many computation cycles we expect an adversary to need to break the M-LRSW. As (t/υ)+3qs+5 2 ≤ ((t/υ) + 3qs + 5) 2 , the theorem shows that, asymptotically, a generic-group algorithm's advantage may increase at most quadratically in the work it performs, which is fairly standard, e.g. for computing discrete logs.
CONCLUSIONS
We presented new cryptographic schemes for use in securing several network routing applications that we discussed, which we believe to be more attractive in practice than existing alternatives. In particular, our ordered multisignature scheme is more efficient than existing aggregate signatures in the relevant settings, and security of our ID-based sequential aggregate signature scheme does not rely on a trusted first signer or synchronized clocks of signers. There are several interesting open problems. Firstly, it would be useful to find an ID-based ordered multisignature scheme that is more efficient than existing identity-based aggregate constructions. It would also be nice to find an IBSAS (or IBAS) scheme based on a more standard computational assumption, but without the functionality limitations of previous constructions. Also, it is important to find such schemes secure in the standard model (without random oracles).
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